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There is only one bad thing about sound sleep. They say it  closely 
resembles dea th.  
- Don Quixote 
 
And dea th sha ll have no dominion. 
 - Dylan Thomas 
 
The Precession of Identical Beings 
The simula tion of Being becomes a  centra l concern in Andrei Tarkovsky’s 
Solaris (1972) and Steven Soderbergh’s Solaris (2002) – adapted from 
Stanislaw Lem’s 1961 novel Solaris1 – both films grapple with the 
implica tions posed by the blurring of boundaries between the human and the 
inhuman, between rea lity and a rt ifice. According to Jean Baudrilla rd, 
simula tion ‘is the dominant schema in the current  code-governed phase’ tha t  
is epitomized in the simulacra , which is produced from a  model without an 
origina l rea lity (1993, 50). In the era  of digita l technology, the act  of 
simula tion is one in which there is no longer any reference to rea lity, instead 
what we have is a  simula tion tha t  is genera ted without a llusion to 
something rea l, but  ra ther to a  code or model tha t  finds its origins outside of 
concrete rea lity. ‘Simula tion is no longer tha t  of a  territory, a  referentia l 
Being, or a  substance. It  is the genera tion by models of a  rea l without origin 
                                                
1
 It is importan t to  note that Lem ‘decidedly d id  not like Tarkovsky’s film,’ as 
stated  with in  an  in terview provided  by Televizja Polska F.A. (Krakow, Poland) in  
the ex tras of the newest North  American  DVD version  of Tarkovski’s Solaris: 
‘Though ostensib ly similar in  p lo t, Tarkovsky’s film explores completely d ifferen t 
themes from Lem’s philosophically orien ted  science fiction .’ 
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or rea lity: a  hyperrea l,’ Baudrilla rd a rgues in ‘The Precession of Simulacra’ 
(1994a , 1). The hyperrea l situa tion in Solaris – where visitors or guests 
manifest  themselves in response to the thoughts of the disoriented crew of 
the space sta t ion orbit ing the Solaris planet  – directly confronts the growing 
cultura l uncerta inty concerning the ability to define the boundaries of 
rea lity, specifica lly in rela t ion to advancing technologies tha t  define our 
interactions and even production of tha t  rea lity. As we a rgue, the events 
depicted in Solaris serve to cha llenge the principle of human rea lity through 
the existence of a  real simula ted Being. This text  investiga tes the formula tion 
of this simula ted Being specifica lly through a  comparison between the ways 
in which Tarkovsky and Soderbergh trea t  the presence of the guests. 
The phantom visitors or guests, produced through the unknown power 
of the Sola ris planet , a re constructed from models tha t  exist  in the minds of 
the space sta t ion crew, specifica lly through the code provided by the 
individua l’s memory. For example, in Soderbergh’s Solaris Rheya  is brought 
into existence from the memories of Chris Kelvin following his first  night  of 
sleep in proximity to Sola ris. The notion of origina lity and the possibility of 
simula ting a  unique existence is the crux of the dilemma facing the 
characters within the story, in which reproduction becomes a  Faustian 
process rife with mora l uncerta inty in the act  of unlimited crea tion without 
reference to the rea l. The result ing inability to dist inguish the rea l from the 
imaginary reflects Friedrich Nietzsche’s sta tement: ‘We have no ca tegories a t  
a ll tha t  permit  us to dist inguish a  “world in itself”  from a  “world of 
appearance”’ (1968, 270).2 In the hyperrea l world of Solaris, the rea l 
becomes increasingly indist inguishable from simula tions and the divide 
between human and inhuman becomes a  mora lly and philosophica lly 
ambiguous one. This is most  evident in the question of authenticity tha t  is 
ra ised in rela t ion to the result ing guests, simula tions based on a  multiplicity 
of memories, centres upon the fundamenta l rela t ionship tha t  we draw 
                                                
2
 In  th is statement, Nietzsche clearly outlines a significant stream of Baudrillard’s 
pro ject regard ing the world  as simulation  and  simulacra, whose influence he has 
repeated ly noted . As he tells Sylvère Lotringer: ‘I…read  Nietzsche very exhaustively, 
and  in  German – I am a Germanist by train ing – and  it was some sort o f perfect 
in tegration  in to  that un iverse’ (2005, 218). 
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between origina lity and Being. In ‘The Work of Art  in the Age of Its 
Technologica l Reproducibility’ Walter Benjamin sta tes: 
 
It  might be sta ted as a  genera l formula  tha t  the technology of 
reproduction detaches the reproduced object  from the sphere of 
tradit ion. By replica ting the work many t imes over, it  substitutes a  
mass existence for a  unique existence. And in permitt ing the 
reproduction to reach the recipient  in his or her own situa tion, it  
actua lizes tha t  which is reproduced. (2003, 254) 
 
This substitution of a  mass existence for a  unique existence, as evidenced 
most clearly by the multiple versions of the guests – a  second copy of Rheya  
appearing a fter Kelvin elimina tes the first  – exposes one of the key 
philosophica l tenets of Being: tha t  an existence is unique and therefore 
unreproducable.  
The multiple versions of Rheya  undermine this conception of Being as 
unique and individua l. Each copy of Rheya  exists and exhibits conscious 
awareness of tha t  existence and, furthermore, she is tormented by the idea  
tha t  she is not  the origina l Rheya . As she sta tes to Chris, she is Rheya  and 
she is not . This is M artin Heidegger’s conception of dasein, which is a  Being’s 
sense of Being: ‘Dasein a lways understands itself in terms of its existence – in 
terms of a  possibility of itself: to be itself or not  itself’ (2008, 33).3 Contra ry 
to Benjamin’s conception of authenticity, Rheya  has a  unique existence, a  
presence in the t ime and space of her being tha t  is unique to her, even though 
she is a  copy. This leaves us with the question: what part  of Being or dasein 
is determined by an originary model or code, tha t  is by the origina l memory 
on which the copy is based? Or to resta te: does our code determine our 
being? 
The seemingly inauthentic guests tha t  visit  the crew orbit ing Sola ris 
blur the line separa ting the human and inhuman by undermining the notion 
tha t  a  sta te of Being is impossible without an origin. Baudrilla rd adopts and 
employs Benjamin’s ideas in ‘Clone Story,’ in which he sta tes: 
                                                
3
 In  a 1994 in terview with  Rex Butler, Baudrillard  hypothesizes that the detour 
that technology has taken  our cu lture on  leads to  a rad ical ‘absence from oneself,’ 
which  he states ‘would  be the counterpoin t to  Heidegger’s hypothesis that 
technology puts us on  the path  to  the onto logical tru th  of the world’ (1997, 49). 
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There is a  procession of reproduction over production, a  procession of 
the genetic model over a ll possible bodies. It  is the irruption of 
technology tha t  controls this reversa l, of a  technology tha t  Benjamin 
was a lready describing, in its tota l consequences, as a  tota l medium, 
but one st ill of the industria l age…but st ill without imagining the 
current sophist ica tion of this technology, which renders the genera tion 
of identica l beings possible, though there is no possibility of a  return to 
an origina l being. (1994, 100) 
 
The guests, as a  procession of identica l beings, cause a  dilemma for the crew 
because they undermine the notion of a  unique and origina l being, one tha t  
exists in a  specific t ime and place never to return a fter dea th. M ore 
accura tely, through their existence on the space sta t ion, the guests redefine 
the possible boundaries of being, a  possibility tha t  precludes the return to an 
origina l Being. Simila r to the conceptua l problematics inherent in cloning 
technologies, to which Baudrilla rd is directly and metaphorica lly referencing, 
the guests serve as embodiments of a  sta te of being tha t  is antithetica l to 
human definit ions of Being human: specifica lly through the dia lectica l 
boundaries of humanity as defined by the inhuman or other. The human is 
therefore defined or understood through exclusionary means, in which, as 
Judith Butler describes, ‘the human is not  only produced over and aga inst  the 
inhuman, but  through a  set  of foreclosures, radica l erasures, tha t  a re, strict ly 
speaking, refused the possibility of cultura l a rt icula tion (1993, 8).4 In other 
words, the possibility of identica l Beings cha llenges the view of the unique 
and originary existence of human life. 
 
The Eternal Return of the Model 
The question of whether the guests achieve a  human-like sta tus or Being is 
fundamenta lly connected to issues of morta lity and immorta lity, or the 
divide between human and inhuman. At their most  basic level, the guests a re 
produced or brought into Being from a  model based upon memories and a re 
therefore simula tions and not ‘rea l.’ As Baudrilla rd sta tes in ‘Clone Story,’ 
                                                
4
 It is importan t to  note that Butler’s d iscussion  of ‘the human’ is d irectly related  to  
her d iscursive investigation  of ‘sex’ and  gender as categories that are used  in  
defin ing ‘the human.’  
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the double or simula tion is precisely not an extension of a  rea l body, but  
instead 
 
it  is an imaginary figure, which, just  like the soul, the shadow, the 
mirror image, haunts the subject  like his other, which makes it  so tha t  
the subject  is simultaneously itself and never resembles itself aga in, 
which haunts the subject  like a  subtle and a lways averted dea th. This 
is not  a lways the case, however: when the double materia lizes, when it  
becomes visible, it  signifies imminent dea th. (Baudrilla rd 1994, 95) 
 
This imminent dea th in fact  represents the lack of origin tha t  plagues the 
guests, as simula ted Beings, precisely because the existence of such Beings 
represent the dea th of the idea  of a  return to an origin. This is Nietzsche’s 
conception of the eterna l recurrence or return: ‘existence as it  is, without 
meaning or a im, yet  recurring inevitably without any fina le of nothingness’ 
(1968, 35).5 As a  simula tion of Being tha t  litera lly returns from the minds of 
the space sta t ion crew, the guests exist  without meaning or a im in 
themselves, yet  their recurring presence is fa r from meaningless or conclusive. 
‘Returning is being, but  only the being of becoming,’ Gilles Deleuze a rgues in 
Difference and Repetit ion, ‘Only the extreme forms return – those which, 
la rge or small, a re deployed within the limit  and extend to the limit  of their 
power, transforming themselves and changing one into another’ (1994, 41). 
Are the guests Beings tha t  a re becoming? If the guests a re a  form of eterna l 
return, what is it  tha t  is returning in their simula ted presence?  
In Tarkovsky’s Solaris, Sartorius – who plays the para llel role to 
Soderbergh’s Dr. Gordon – says to Hari: ‘You’re just  a  reproduction, a  
mechanica l reproduction. A copy. A matrix.’ Hari replies: ‘Yes. But I am 
becoming a  human being.’ This exchange between Sartorius and Hari 
illustra tes the differentia t ion tha t  begins to develop between Hari and the 
model from which she is produced: Hari is becoming. As Steven Dillon points 
out  in The Solaris Effect : ‘Hari’s identity does not  just  waver between 
human and inhuman, between rea lity and ha llucina tion, but  between a rt  
                                                
5
 Nietzsche’s eternal return  relates d irectly to  Baudrillard’s conception  of the 
d isappearance of the subject in to  the object. As Baudrillard  states: ‘The Eternal 
Return  is now the return  of the infin itely small, the fractal – the repetition  of a 
microscopic, inhuman scale’ (2001, 77). 
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and technology. How should we ca tegorize her existence?’ (2006, 13). 
Tarkovsky presents a  mora l deba te in the exchange between Hari and 
Sartorius in the libra ry (one tha t  Hari ult imately loses when she hopelessly 
submits herself to his annihila tor) over what it  means to be human. A point  
tha t  Hari strikes home when she says to Sartorius: ‘In inhuman condit ions, 
he (Kris) has behaved humanely. And you act  as if none of this concerns you, 
and consider your guests…something externa l, a  hindrance. But it’s part  of 
you. It’s your conscience.’ In this manner, the guests function as 
manifesta t ions of conscience – guilty or otherwise – for the space sta t ion 
crew, Sola ris providing the opportunity for them to correct  their self-
perceived wrongs. 
Tarkovsky underscores this by presenting us with a  contempla tive Hari 
who sits smoking as she looks a t  Brueghel’s pa inting Hunters in the Snow  – 
the camera  panning over the pa inting as if imita t ing Hari’s wandering eyes. 
Brueghel’s pa inting is suddenly replaced with an image of Kelvin as a  child 
playing in the snow. Hari notices Kelvin’s presence behind her and says 
‘Forgive me, my darling I was lost  in thought.’ Hari has become lost  in the 
thoughts of both Brueghel and Kelvin. When she speaks to Kris ‘we rea lize 
tha t  through Brueghel’ and Kelvin ‘she has been able to apprehend what it  is 
to be a  human being on earth’ (Hyman 1976, 56). Part  of the mora l dilemma 
tha t  the crew, most prominently Hari, concerns the boundaries tha t  delimit  
human existence and knowledge. The ending of the film avoids answering 
these questions. Tarkovsky instead a lludes symbolica lly to spiritua lity and 
religious belief, leaving the viewer in the posit ion of confronting and 
negotia t ing these questions for themselves – in the same fashion tha t  Hari 
engages with the pa inting by Brueghel. 
Hari cla ims she is ‘becoming human,’ a  process tha t  is ironica lly 
concluded only through her own dea th – a  virtua l suicide in which what is 
destroyed is the ability of her image to return. Hari’s transit ion from 
immorta l to morta l through her dea th grants her the sta tus of an entity tha t  
is aware of their own dea th, a  sta tus tha t  is fulfilled only posthumously – 
knowledge tha t  is often posited as the fea ture tha t  dist inguishes humanity 
from other living crea tures. Her dasein understands itself in terms of the 
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possibility of Being or not  Being itself (Heidegger 2008, 33). The period 
before Hari / Rheya’s successful suicide, a fter being made aware of Sartorius 
/ Dr. Gordon’s successful annihila t ion of a  guest/ visitor with their machine, 
is one in which she can be seen to be humanized through the knowledge of 
her morta lity. But, this knowledge cannot be seen as an achievement of the 
sta tus of Being because of her fa iled a t tempt to kill herself by drinking liquid 
oxygen, her return from dea th revea ling her immorta lity. This unsuccessful 
suicide a t tempt shows tha t  the knowledge of her morta lity and her 
subsequent humanizing dea th can paradoxica lly only be known after dea th 
has occurred.  
As a  living Being, Tarkovsky’s Hari never rea lizes her full potentia l to 
become a  ‘rea l’ human; this lack of rea liza tion is problematic to the plot  
because it  illustra tes Tarkovsky’s unwillingness to depart  from his religious 
interpreta t ion of Lem’s book, in which Solaris becomes an embodied return 
to the divine. This is epitomized in the obviousness of the symbolic 
conclusion of the film, in which ‘the image is tha t  of the Return of the 
Prodiga l Son,’ an ending tha t  Le Fanu notes even Tarkovsky ‘was not 
pleased with’ (1987, 53). Tarkovsky is much more concerned with the mora l 
implica tions of humanity engaging with Sola ris, of the price of knowledge. 
This is evident in the exchange between Burton and Kelvin on earth. Burton 
says to Kelvin: ‘You want to destroy tha t  which we a re presently incapable 
of understanding? Forgive me, but  I am not an advoca te of knowledge a t  
any price. Knowledge is only va lid when it’s based on mora lity.’ To which 
Kelvin a rrogantly responds ‘M an is the one who renders science mora l or 
immora l.’ It  is Tarkovsky’s spiritua lity tha t  prevents him from 
acknowledging the potentia l of the hyperrea l in the diegesis of Solaris; 
instead he becomes preoccupied with love and hope in a  world tha t  appears 
to be rapidly exhausting both feelings in favor of appearances.6 
                                                
6
 This criticism regard ing the fact that Tarkovsky’s films ‘are not reticent about 
their sp irituality and  religious content’ has consisten tly been  ‘a source of irritation  
and  impatience,’ as Le Fanu d iscusses at the end  of h is book on  the filmmaker; at 
issue ‘are grave matters of taste and  tactfu lness involved  in  the artist’s coming down 
on  the righ t side as between true religious feeling and  religiosity’ (1987, 138).  
Film-Philosophy 14 .1  2010 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
260 
In a  clear departure from the character of Hari, Rheya  defines herself 
as incomplete to Kelvin. Rheya’s inability to acknowledge her potentia l to 
be more than the predetermining and controlling model of Kelvin’s memories 
leads her to question her rela t ionship and connection to the planet  Sola ris 
tha t  makes her physica l presence possible on the sta t ion. As Rheya  sta tes in 
rela t ion to Sola ris: ‘It  crea ted me and yet  I can’t  communica te with it . It  
must  hear me, though. It  must  know what’s happening to me.’ It  is through 
this assumed agency on the part  of Kelvin and Solaris tha t  she first  overlooks 
her own agency. Rheya  defines herself as incomplete to Kelvin. As she sta tes: 
‘Don’t  you see? I came from your memory of her. Tha t’s the problem. I’m 
not a  whole person. In your memory you get  to control everything.’ Rheya’s 
cla im tha t  Kelvin has total control over her, because he controls the model 
on which she was based, aga in serves to highlight  her sta tus as a  third-order 
simulacra , which Baudrilla rd rela tes to the qua lit ies of ‘tota l opera tiona lity, 
hyperrea lity, a im of tota l control’ (Baudrilla rd 1994, 121). Rheya’s 
sta tement is contradictory because the authority needed to give such a  
sta tement necessarily implies uniqueness and autonomy, a  control tha t  she 
a t tributes to Chris. Because she was crea ted by Solaris and through Kelvin’s 
memories, Rheya  concludes tha t  she an imaginary being and therefore not  
‘rea l.’ 
Ironica lly, this mistake of assuming Sola ris knows what is happening, 
of mistaking the planet  as the source of the returning models of existence – 
in terms of the guests and the crews’ perception of rea lity in genera l – is one 
tha t  Kelvin a lso makes. At one point  in the film Kelvin poses the question to 
Gibarian: ‘What does Solaris want with us?’ Gibarian replies: ‘Why do you 
think it  has to want something?’ It  is important  to note tha t  Kelvin’s 
interactions with Gibarian on the Sola ris sta t ion a re phantasmal, this 
exchange with Kelvin is presented in a  dream-like sta te and Gibarian has 
a lready committed suicide. Gibarian’s presence as a  guest  or manifesta t ion 
of Sola ris – which is the most likely scenario – serves to open up the 
possibility for understanding Solaris, a  possibility tha t  can be summed up in 
Gibarian’s comment to Kelvin: ‘There a re no answers, only choices.’ In other 
words, choices become the predominant means of defining Being for Kelvin, 
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who, because of a  lack of answers, is placed in a  posit ion to make decisions 
on fa ith ra ther than scientific ra t iona lity. This presupposit ion of a  causa l 
rela t ionship serves to limit  Kelvin’s ability, as well as the abilit ies of the 
crew, to understand the Sola ris planet , because this rela t ionship assumes a  
predetermined model on both sides. At the t ime Kelvin was unable to even 
consider Gibarian’s question because he was too close to view the situa tion 
with impartia lity, in much the same way tha t  Rheya  was init ia lly unable to 
distance herself from the idea  of being a  simula tion to face the possibility of 
her own uniqueness.  
Rheya  wrongly assumes tha t  she does not possess the distance from 
herself necessary to judge her sta tus as a  Being when she holds herself to a  
predetermined model of Kelvin’s memory of his wife. This becomes a  
question not of the rea l or the imaginary, as both a re agents of Being, but  
ra ther the distance of Being: the distance between the levels of simulacra . 
This distance, simila r to the tempora l and spa tia l differences tha t  divide the 
two films, is the space tha t  separa tes the simula tion from its model. And it  is 
this distance, this space of being in a  specific t ime and place, which makes 
Rheya  unique. Within a  moment of existence the rea l and the imaginary are 
the experiences of life.  
The Athena , the name of the shutt le Gordon used to escape Sola ris, 
provides a  metaphor for the genesis of Rheya . Like the mythica l Goddess, 
Rheya  emerges from Kelvin’s head as a  whole person, even though she is 
modeled a fter a  simula tion. This is a  metaphor of the reproductive process – 
the dream ‘of an eterna l twining substituted for sexua l procrea tion tha t  is 
linked to dea th’ – in which there is a  division tha t  forms between the 
reproduction and the model from which the reproduction emerges 
(Baudrilla rd 1994, 96). This metaphor serves to expose the fa lse concerns 
tha t  Rheya  and Kelvin have for the authenticity or rea lity of Rheya’s Being. 
Regardless of the fact  tha t  she was crea ted or simula ted using the model of 
Kelvin’s memory of his dead wife, ult imately she is a  Being. 
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The plots of both the Tarkovsky and the Soderbergh versions of Solaris a re 
not  concerned with the rea l per say, but  ra ther in the differences used to 
define rea lity. M ore specifica lly, each film is concerned with defining the 
possible loca tion or loca tions of rea lity in rela t ion to the simulacra  of image 
technology. In fact , the progressive genesis tha t  Rheya  goes through as a  
Being emerging out of the sta tus of simula tion and simulacra  can be seen as 
mirroring Baudrilla rd’s delinea tion of the orders of simulacra :  
 
To the first  ca tegory belongs the imaginary of the utopia. To the 
second corresponds science fict ion, strict ly speaking. To the third 
corresponds – is there an imaginary tha t  might correspond to this 
order? The most likely answer is tha t  the good old imaginary of 
science fict ion is dead and tha t  something else is in the process of 
emerging. (Baudrilla rd 1994b, 121) 
 
The first  emergence of the guest  Rheya  begins as a  manifesta t ion of Kelvin’s 
longing for his dead wife, tha t  is as a  counterfeit  of rea lity which Kelvin 
himself disposes of because he knows it  to be an imita t ion of utopia, and not 
rea l. In her second manifesta t ion, Rheya  appears to be the product of 
multiplica tion, as if she were one of a  series of imita t ions based upon the 
rea l, but  her sta tus as part  of a  series nega tes her being mistaken for an 
imita t ion of rea lity, placing her instead in the rea lm of science f ict ion. This is 
the sta tus tha t  Hari is left  in by Tarkovsky a t  the end of his version of 
Solaris. In Soderbergh’s version, however, Rheya  returns a  third t ime a t  the 
end of the film coupled with a  manifesta t ion of Kelvin. This is the only way 
Rheya , as well as Kelvin, a re able to ‘exit  from the crisis of representa tion’ 
tha t  is enacted through the eterna l return of the guests, the rea l is ‘sea led off 
in a  pure repetit ion’ of the simula tion of Being (Baudrilla rd 1993, 72). 
The continuing a ttempts of the crew orbit ing the Sola ris planet  to 
define the ‘rea l’ within the multitude of simula ted experiences, most  notably 
the repea ted return of the guests, therefore focuses on the problematic of 
a t tempting to dist inguish between rea lity and simula tion or simulacra . This 
dist inction, however, is trea ted very differently by each of the filmmakers 
who, in a  Baudrilla rian sense, crea te their own hyperrea l versions of Solaris. 
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Tarkovsky uses this problematic to approach questions of Being from the 
perspective of belief and conscience, whereas Soderbergh uses this 
problematic to ask questions of Being in rela t ion to issues of identity and 
subjectivity. Let  us focus on two examples tha t  demonstra te this difference: 
the colour shifts used by Tarkovsky throughout his film and Soderbergh’s 
decision to make Snow a  guest . 
Tarkovsky’s use of colour shifts throughout his film demonstra tes a  
preoccupa tion with the shift ing perceptions of rea lity as filtered through 
memory tha t  is often plagued by the doubts of conscience. The most 
dramatic use of colour shifts occur when Kelvin a rrives on the sta t ion and he 
views the message left  by Gibarian, whom Kris has just  discovered has 
committed suicide. As the unsett led Kelvin barricades himself in his quarters 
to sleep, the film shifts from colour to black and white. The message he plays 
from Gibarian is t inted blue on the television monitor, while his room begins 
as black and white turning a  blue t int  as Kelvin understands and 
symbolica lly enters Gibarian’s word. Gibarian speaks to Kelvin beyond the 
grave, his eyes seeking those of his friend: ‘I am my own judge. Have you 
seen her? Kris, understand tha t  this is not  madness. It  has something to do 
with conscience.’ The television monitor casts a  flickering glow on Kris’s face 
as he looks away and thinks about what Gibarian has sa id. As Kelvin looks 
back a t  the television Gibarian walks away, ostensibly to his dea th, and the 
film turns white for a  moment. After glancing a t  himself in a  mirror, Kelvin 
picks up Gibarian’s gun and lies down to sleep. The camera  slowly zooms in 
on Kelvin’s sleeping face; white scra tches briefly appear on the surface of the 
film and quickly vanish. The scra tches can be seen as representing the 
ontologica l instability of Kelvin’s mind as Sola ris manifests his memory of 
Hari in rea lity. A jump cut marks the shift  from the black and white close-up 
of Kelvin’s dreaming face to the orange t inted close-up of Hari’s face. We 
next see Kelvin in full colour lying in his bed as he expressionlessly looks a t  
Hari. Tarkovsky uses colour shifts in this sequence to convey the modula ting 
boundaries between rea lity and memory.7 Kelvin struggles with the mora l 
                                                
7
 Similarly, Soderbergh  employs ex tensive use of co lour filters primarily to  
d istinguish  between life on  earth  and  the dream world  of the space station . Kelvin’s 
Film-Philosophy 14 .1  2010 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
264 
uncerta inty of what is happening to him and the crew his perceptions of 
rea lity and memory become unstable. Has he gone mad or is this rea l?  
Through most of Soderbergh’s film, Snow – who is dist inctly different  
from Tarkovsky’s corresponding character Snaut – is perceived and trea ted 
as if he was a  ‘rea l’ human Being; a  ‘fact’ tha t  is cha llenged by the uncanny 
discovery of Snow’s dead doppelganger hidden in the ceiling of the morgue. 
This discovery forces Dr. Gordon and Kelvin to re-eva lua te their perspectives 
on him, a  re-eva lua tion tha t  exposes the contradictions inherent in their 
definit ions of what constitutes a  rea l Being. ‘Nothing is worse than the truer 
than the true,’ Baudrilla rd sta tes; using the example of ‘the automaton in the 
story of the illusionist ,’ he notes tha t  
 
what is terrifying is not  the disappearance of the na tura l into the 
perfection of the a rt ificia l (the automaton made by the illusionist  
imita ted every human movement so perfectly as to be indiscernible 
from the illusionist  himself). It  is, on the contra ry, the disappearance of 
the a rt ifice into the obviousness of the na tura l. (1990, 51) 
 
Simila r to the automaton, the guest  Snow imita tes human movement and 
action so perfectly as to be indiscernible from the origina l Snow himself. It  is 
only a t  tha t  end tha t  Snow turns ‘out to be another a lien simulacra , just  like 
Rheya’ (Dillon 2006, 42). What is brought to light  through this problematic 
scenario is the rea liza tion of the extent  of their inability to dist inguish rea lity 
from the imaginary, because it  begs the question of what constitutes rea lity 
itself.  
The model of rea lity tha t  Dr. Gordon and Kelvin hold is dramatica lly 
cha llenged by Snow’s story of his coming into Being. As the guest  sta tes: ‘I 
survived the first  thirty seconds of this b-b- life - whatever you want to ca ll 
it  - by killing someone and, oh, ah, by killing someone who happens to be 
me.’ Snow’s account of his own genesis, which highlights the struggle for 
defining existence tha t  troubles both the guests and the crew, is a  
                                                                                                                       
life on  earth  prior to  h is departure, and  in  h is later memories, is a subdued orange-
yellow tone. In  contrast, the space station  is p redominantly a b lue tin t. As Dillon  
states ‘Solaris goes back  and  forth’ between these two worlds, ‘between past and  
present, Earth  and  space station , yet…neither world  is more real or natural than  
the o ther’ (2006, 43). 
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manifesta t ion of the conflict  over an inability to dist inguish the rea l and the 
imaginary tha t  is a t  the heart  of Solaris. The increasingly unstable 
perception of the ca tegories of rea lity and being by Gordon and Snow is 
further undermined by the indetermina te na ture of Snow’s subjectivity. The 
instability of Snow as a  subject  points to a  disappearance of origin and end. 
The possibilit ies of disappearance for Baudrilla rd is one of metamorphosis: 
 
something which disappears, the traces of which a re effaced, origin 
and end a re effaced. So things a re not  any longer understood in terms 
of linearity. The passage to the sta te of disappearance, fundamenta lly, 
is the disappearance of the linear order, of the order of cause and 
effect . Therefore it  gives to tha t  which disappears in the horizon of the 
other the opportunity to reappear. (1993a , 54) 
 
The unnoticed disappearance of the origina l Snow marks the disappearance 
of linearity, the vanishing of cause and effect . The planet  Sola ris offers the 
possibility of an endless cha in of Beings tha t  a re without origin and end, an 
ontologica l instability tha t  threa tens the crew’s perception of rea lity.  
As in the case of Tarkovsky’s Hari – whose ult imate morta lity 
paradoxica lly grants her posthumously the sta tus of a  human being which 
ironica lly denies a ll the consequences of her achievement – Snow is only able 
to achieve the sta tus of Being through dea th. In a  Baudrilla rdian twist , it  is 
the dea th of the rea l tha t  gives life to the hyperrea l Being of Snow. In effect , 
this discovery reduces ‘the sense tha t  humans a re radica lly dist inct  from 
a liens,’ Dillon suggests (2006, 42). The Being of Snow is simultaneously 
himself and yet  can never resemble himself aga in; he is unique through the 
mere fact  tha t  the distance between him and his dead ‘origina l’ has been 
collapsed. This is evident in the fact  tha t  the crew could not tell tha t  he was 
a  guest; not  simply a  copy of Snow but Snow’s simulacra . The manifesta t ion 
of Snow’s double is therefore accompanied by imminent dea th, a  dea th tha t  
resolves the conflict  between the rea l and the imaginary through the dea th 
of the rea l itself. Thus, it  is in the futile a t tempts of Dr. Gordon and Kelvin 
to construct  a  viable definit ion of what constitutes rea lity, to solve the 
dilemma tha t  Sola ris crea tes, tha t  they come to rea lize the truth of what 
Gibarian tells Kelvin, ‘There a re no answers, only choices.’ The choice of 
Snow’s double was to live. 
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It  is important  to note the significance of the name ‘Snow,’ which 
makes reference to concepts of purity and rebirth, as well as dea th. Snow’s 
act  of defining himself in his sta tement ‘I am a  gift’ implies the gift  of new 
possibilit ies offered by Sola ris; the gift  tha t  is given and received freely 
increases exponentia lly, it  returns to the giver. But like a ll gifts, the gift  must  
be returned. As George Bata ille points out: ‘Thus the gift  is the opposite of 
what it  seemed to be: To give is obviously to lose, but  the loss apparently 
brings a  profit  to the one who susta ins it’ (1989, 70). Thus, Dr. Gordon’s gift  
of dea th to Rheya  through her use of the Higgs device results in a  loss tha t  
litera lly dra ins the fuel-cell reactors of the space sta t ion. In response to this 
gift  of energy and dea th, Sola ris ‘sta rted taking on mass exponentia lly.’ At 
first  this gift  appears to be a t  the expense of Kelvin’s life, in the end however 
this expenditure reunites him with Rheya . This can be seen as a  symbolic 
joining of the rea l and the imaginary through the gift  of exchange – 
exemplified in Soderbergh’s version with Sola ris, visua lly represented as an 
egg, subsuming the (spermatoid-like) space sta t ion, in an enactment of the 
reproductive process. This consumption ‘is the way in which separate beings 
communica te’: it  is in fact  the fina l communica tion between Kelvin and 
Solaris (1989, 58). It  is Kelvin’s gift  of himself to Sola ris tha t  a llows him to 
eterna lly return as a  simula ted, hyperrea l Being.  
The unknown power of the Sola ris planet , which is litera lly in excess 
of human understanding, manifests what the subject  desires most. What then 
is the psychologica l implica tion of the ‘origina l’ Snow’s manifesta t ion of 
himself, a  self tha t  he tries to kill? It  is interesting to note tha t  in Tarkovsky’s 
Solaris, Snaut memorably sta tes: ‘M an needs man.’ In other words, man 
needs a  reflection of himself. This is exactly what Snow gets with his guest  
and yet  such a  manifesta t ion can only be a  simula tion or copy; Snow’s 
double is therefore not ‘man,’ not  human. This comment by Snaut is reflected 
by Soderbergh’s version of Gibarian, who observes to Kelvin: ‘We don’t  
want other worlds we want mirrors.’ Yet, the ra t iona le for Rheya  / Hari 
wanting to kill herself part ia lly came out of the fact  tha t  she does not 
recognize herself  in her reflection. The human characters of Solaris do not 
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want a  simula tion of rea lity: they want to see the world they imagine to be 
rea l reflected back a t  them.  
 
The Puppet’s Dream 
Within their respective versions of Solaris, Tarkovsky and Soderbergh adapt 
Lem’s text  as a  model upon which the simula ted rea lity of their narra tives 
a re based. This process is further complica ted when considering Soderbergh’s 
no doubt int imate awareness of Tarkovsky’s film.8 The differences between 
the Tarkovsky and Soderbergh adapta tions of Solaris can be seen in the 
subtle modula tions within each version, with Soderbergh even adapting 
elements from Tarkovsky’s adapta tion. For example, Tarkovsky’s reference 
to Cervantes’ text  within a  text , ‘sleep resembles dea th,’ can be seen to 
para llel Soderbergh’s anaphoric repetit ion of Dylan Thomas’ famous line: 
‘And dea th sha ll have no dominion.’ Both reflect  a  doubling, a  copying of 
rea lity, the world within a  world, and yet  each in its own way utilizes 
part icula r possibilit ies within the rubric of simula tion in order to develop the 
story in specific ways.  
The character of Rheya  provides an idea l model for interpreting the 
levels of simula tion and simulacra  within the hyperrea l world of Solaris. 
Rheya  is a  simula tion not of the origina l physica l Rheya , the person who 
killed herself on Earth, but  of Kelvin’s fragmented memories through which 
she has been reconstructed by the planet  Sola ris. As Dr. Gordon says to 
Kelvin in Soderbergh’s version, this guest  Rheya  is ‘a  mirror tha t  reflects part  
of your mind. You provide the formula .’ As Deleuze notes: ‘The identity of 
the simulacra , simula ted identity, finds itself projected or retrojected on to 
the interna l difference. The simula ted externa l resemblance finds itself 
interiorized in the system’ (1994, 302). The identity of the guest  Rheya  is not  
                                                
8
 The cover of the North  American  DVD release of Soderbergh’s Solaris p resents the 
claim that it is ‘A new version  of Stan islaw Lem’s sci-fi classic,’ a claim that is 
repeated  by the films producer James Cameron in  the ‘HBO Special: Inside Solaris’ 
featurette on  the DVD, in  which  he states: ‘This isn’t really a remake of the 
Tarkovsky film, it’s a d ifferen t adaptation  of the underlying novel by Stanislaw 
Lem’. This strategy of d istancing th is version  of Solaris from Tarkovsky’s, claiming 
that it is no t really a remake but is based  upon an  ‘original,’ appears to  be an  overt 
attempt to  avoid  having the film be viewed as a copy or simulation .  
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simply copied from an origina l model, but  is in fact  produced through a  
multitude of simula ted externa l resemblances – imagery tha t  exists only in 
Kelvin’s memory – tha t  have been interiorized into the guest’s Being. In 
Tarkovsky’s film there a re two versions of Hari, while in Soderbergh’s 
remake there a re three versions of Rheya . We believe tha t  it  is Soderbergh’s 
third version of Rheya  – who appears a fter Dr. Gordon has helped the 
second Rheya  end her life – tha t  represents the merging of rea lity and 
imagina tion into a  hyperrea l Being.  
This hyperrea l meeting of rea lity and imagina tion is the 
materia liza tion of the puppet’s dream tha t  Gibarian speaks of to Kelvin: 
‘But like a ll puppets you think you’re actua lly human. It’s the puppet’s 
dream being human.’ But more to the point  is the dream of humans to 
exceed the limita tions of the body while remaining sentient  and in control. 
As Harold B. Segel points out  in Pinocchio's Progeny: 
 
The fascina tion with puppets…reaches so fa r back into human history 
tha t  it  must  be regarded as a  response to a  fundamenta l need or needs. 
It  is, clearly, a  projection of the obsession of human beings with their 
own image, with their own likeness, the obsession tha t  underlies 
a rt ist ic portra iture, the building of sta tues, and the extraordinary and 
enduring popularity of photography. M ore profoundly, it  revea ls a  
yearning to play god, to master life… And fina lly the obsession with 
becoming godlike expresses itself in the most powerful of a ll delusions, 
the belief tha t  one can crea te rea l life outside the normal human 
reproductive cycle. (1995, 4) 
 
The disembodied distance between the guest  Rheya  and the human being 
Rheya  – who, because she is dead, survives only in Kelvin’s memory and 
exists essentia lly as a  phantom or ghost  – becomes reabsorbed in the 
simula tion, standing in as an embodiment of the rea l. From the moment a  
guest  comes into awareness of their surrounding they begin constructing a  
history within the space and t ime they a re loca ted, systematica lly forming 
their rea lity.  For Kelvin, and eventua lly Rheya  herself, this confla t ion of the 
distance between the rea l and the imaginary, as well as the subsequent 
investment of a  lived history or rea lity together on the Sola ris sta t ion, grants 
Rheya  her unique existence, which is a  manifesta t ion of the puppet’s dream. 
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In this manner, Rheya  is not  a  counterfeit  of an origina l person or 
human being, nor is she in a  closed system in rela t ion to a  series produced 
from an origina l. She exists instead as a  simula tion based on the information 
model exist ing in Kelvin’s imagina tion, a  model tha t  she appears to expand 
beyond by the end of the film. This corresponds with what Baudrilla rd refers 
to as a  third-order simulacra , tha t  is a  simulacra  of simula tion, in which: 
 
There is no more counterfeit ing of an origina l, as there was in the first  
order, and no more pure series as there were in the second; there a re 
models from which a ll forms proceed according to modula ted 
differences. (Baudrilla rd 1993, 56)  
 
Through the process of reproduction, as in the case of the multiple 
simula tions of Rheya , each successive version possesses the potentia lity for a  
unique existence – a fter their materia liza tion via  the model – in tha t  she is 
not  bound to an origina l. In other words, even though Rheya  is based on a  
model this does not predetermine the course of her existence. As Kelvin says 
to a  distraught Rheya : ‘I don’t  believe we a re predetermined to relive our 
past . I think we can choose to do it  differently.’ With the possibility tha t  a  
simula tion is not  predetermined to follow the model they a re based on comes 
the potentia l for a  new beginning. Rheya  has the choice to become more 
than simply a  simula tion of Kelvin’s memories of his lost  wife: Rheya  is 
capable of becoming a  Being.  
In the fina l incarna tion of Rheya , there is some ambiguity as to the 
model used for her simula tion, as well as tha t  of Kelvin’s, who is himself 
represented as a  simula tion. This becomes apparent in the fina l scenes when 
Kelvin is shown cutt ing himself in his kitchen and the cut  hea ls 
instantaneously; this scene mirrors one of the opening scenes of the film in 
which Kelvin cuts his finger in his kitchen on Earth. As Dillon sta tes:  
 
Before he meets Rheya , Kris has tried to a rrange a  world without 
imagery, without illusion. Yet in the fina l sequence, which takes place 
we know not where…he has a  photograph of Rheya  stuck on the 
fridge. The image, and the film, may not be true, but  it  is necessary, or 
inescapable. (2006, 42) 
 
Film-Philosophy 14 .1  2010 
 
Film-Philosophy | ISSN: 1466-4615   
 
270 
This return of the beginning scene of the film represented a t  the end serves to 
correct  Kelvin’s mistakes tha t  were present in the init ia l scene, a  litera l 
hea ling of old wounds.  The picture of Rheya  on the fridge – a  correction in 
response to Rheya  telling Kelvin tha t  she thought it  was odd tha t  he had no 
pictures in his apartment – and, most importantly, the presence of Rheya . As 
Kelvin sta ted upon his simula ted return to Earth: ‘I was haunted by the idea  
tha t  I remembered her wrong…that somehow I was wrong about 
everything.’ The reconstitution of these elements can be seen as a  mastery of 
his life tha t  was not achieved in rea lity, where his existence was much like 
tha t  of the puppet whose strings a re out of his control. As Rheya  sta tes in 
response to Kelvin’s question as to whether he is a live or dead: ‘We don’t  
have to think like tha t  anymore.’ Rheya  and Kelvin ‘a re reduced to working 
on what happens beyond the end, on technica l immorta lity, without having 
passed through dea th, through the symbolic elabora tion of the end’ 
(Baudrilla rd 1994, 91). The collapsing of such dist inctions as life and dea th, 
morta lity and immorta lity, rea l and simula tion, ra ises the possibility of a  
fourth level simulacrum, one tha t  annihila tes the distance between rea lity 
and imagina tion through the possibility of an immorta l existence, one tha t  
continua lly a llows for new beginnings.  
Kelvin, in fact , never leaves the Sola ris sta t ion, turning a round a fter 
stopping a t  the precipice of the Athena’s docking door. He stays on the 
sta t ion, forcing Dr. Gordon to return to Earth a lone. The scene of him in this 
kitchen without Rheya  thus functions as a  hypothetica l vision of what his 
life might be like if he did return to Earth, abandoning on Sola ris a ll of the 
hope and desire he has to correct  the mistakes of his past; but  this scene a lso 
demonstra tes his previous lack of Being, as he simply lived without feeling 
hollowly performing the ‘millions of gestures tha t  constitute life on Earth.’ 
‘If life is only a  need for surviva l at all costs,’ Baudrilla rd sta tes in rela t ion to 
Bata ille’s notions of expenditure and Dea th, ‘then annihila t ion is a  priceless 
luxury’ (1993, 156). If Kelvin’s life on Earth consisted simply in a  need to 
survive at all costs, pa rt icula rly a fter Rheya’s dea th, the annihila t ion of his 
originary Being is a  priceless luxury for the gift  of his eterna l return with 
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Rheya . This life may not be ‘true,’ but  for Kelvin it  is necessary and 
inescapable. 
The end of Tarkovsky’s Solaris presents a  more ambiguous and 
religiously symbolic ending, with Kris returning to his dacha  as the prodiga l 
son who fa lls to his knees before his now dead fa ther.9 This scene ends with 
the camera  pulling back to revea l the a rt ifice or unrea lity of this return, the 
dacha  being loca ted not on Earth but on an island in the churning seas of 
Sola ris. ‘Are we to believe tha t  the soft  planet  Sola ris gives a  reply,’ Deleuze 
asks of Tarkovsky’s film, concluding tha t  it  ‘does not  open up this optimism,’ 
instead returning to an eterna lly ‘closed door’ (1989, 75). Unlike the overt  
hyperrea lity of Kelvin and Rheya’s simula ted Being a fter being subsumed 
within Solaris, Tarkovsky a ttempts to envision a  return to the origin (the 
Fa ther as divine), even if it  is obviously unrea l. If the Sola ris planet  a llows 
Kelvin to ‘play god,’ the life crea ted in the two versions of Solaris is 
dramatica lly different . Whereas Tarkovsky’s Kelvin gives himself over to the 
will of Sola ris, in a  sense becoming the planet’s puppet, Soderbergh’s Kelvin 
crea tes the life he previously was unable to live, embracing the simulacra  of 
the puppet’s dream and a llowing it  to become real. 
 
 
                                                
9
 One of the key material d ifferences is the length  of the films. Whereas Tarkovsky 
produces a long and  in tense 165  minutes, Soderbergh’s version  is a more 
condensed  and  stimulating 99  minutes. This d ifference has profound effects in  
terms of viewing experience, particu larly in  terms of Tarkovsky’s d iscriminating 
and  even  excessive temporality. His films, accord ing to  Timothy M orton , 
‘annih ilate the sense of time and  use an  experience of boredom…as the link  
between what we th ink  of as the fu lly human (aesthetic contemplation) and  what 
we th ink  of as nonhuman’ (2008, 90). This d irectly relates to  Tarkovsky’s moral 
and  religious tendencies, which  are also  evident in  all o f h is films, in  which  he 
attempts to  use the experience of viewing as a form of meditative engagement. In  
addition  to  a filmic simulation  of reality, which  is arguably Soderbergh’s focus and  
why he reduced  the length  of the film, Tarkovsky wanted  to  simulate or enact 
aesthetic contemplation  through a d irect experience of duration . 
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